To examine the sensitivity of our results, different conditioning information sets are experimented with. Our results are shown to be robust.
Introduction
This paper investigates the relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth in China. China has been experiencing fast economic growth and rapid expansion of financial intermediation in the last thirty years. Since the start of its reforms in 1978, the Chinese economy has maintained an annual growth rate of 9.8% in real terms (China Statistical Yearbook 2007) , while the total loans outstanding in its financial institutions relative to GDP has increased from 51% to 107% (China Compendium of Statistics, 1949 Statistics, -2004 China Statistical Yearbook 2007) . As the largest emerging market and with many years of uninterrupted fast growth, China presents us with an interesting case for study. One fundamental question is: what is the relationship between financial development and economic growth in China? A unique feature of this paper is that our empirical investigation is based on a rich set of citylevel data, in contrast to existing studies that are based on national or provincial datasets.
In the finance-growth literature, China attracts great interest as a unique case. According to Allen et al. (2005) , China is an important counterexample to the common finding in the finance-growth literature, since China has enjoyed fast economic growth for more than 30 years while its financial sector is very much under state control and is still quite underdeveloped today. The literature on the relationship between finance and growth in China generally finds a negative relationship. Using provincial data over the period 1990 , Boyreau-Debray (2003 found that financial inter-mediation has a negative impact on local economic growth. She attributed the negative influence to the banking sector's support of loss-making state-owned enterprises. Hasan, Wachtel and Zhou (2009) also found that the financial sector has a negative influence on economic growth using provincial data over the period [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . In contrast, using provincial data for the period 1985 , Chen (2006 showed that China' financial development contributes to economic growth. He further identified two channels for the financial sector to contribute to the economy: mobilization of savings and the substitution of loans for budget appropriation. In addition, using provincial data for the period 1995 -2003 , Cheng and Degryse (2007 , who studied the impact of the development of banks and non-bank financial institutions on local economic growth, found that banking development has a significant positive effect on economic growth. Guariglia and Poncet (2008) used data from 1989 to 2003 and two different sets of indicators of financial development to examine the relationship between finance and growth in China. They found that their China-specific indicators measuring state intervention in finance are negatively associated with economic growth, while the indicators measuring market-driven financing are positively associated with economic growth. Finally, Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2008) used firm-level data to examine the relationship between firm growth and firm financing patterns, i.e., formal versus informal finance. They concluded that it is the formal financial system that spurs firm growth, while fundings from informal channels do not. In addition, Park and Sehrt (2001) found that policy lending by state banks did not fall during the period [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] , and consequently the financial reforms in the mid-1990s were not able to turn the trend of worsening bank performance around.
We have a unique dataset from 286 Chinese cities over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Our dataset has two features: (1) Unlike the existing empirical studies on China's finance and growth that employ provincial data, we choose to use city-level data which have more local observations and information; (2) We focus on the period after China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 so as to investigate the effect of recent financial reforms. Results from both traditional cross-sectional regressions and first-differenced generalized method of moments (GMM) and system GMM estimators for dynamic panel data suggest that most traditional indicators of financial development are generally positively associated with economic growth. This result runs contrary to the existing conclusion that a state-ruled banking sector, such as that in China, hinders economic growth because of the distorting nature of the government. Since we focus on the years after China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 while the existing studies mainly covered the years before 2001, our finding suggests that the financial reforms that have taken place after China's accession to the WTO are in the right direction. To examine the sensitivity of our results, we experiment with different conditioning information sets. In addition, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by introducing a dummy variable to indicate coastal cities, capital cities and the cities that have hosted foreign bank entries. Our results are shown to be robust.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review. Section 3 briefly describes the development of the Chinese financial sector and provides some background information about financial intermediation in China. Section 4 describes the dataset, defines the variables, and presents summary statistics. Section 5 presents the results using purely cross-sectional data, while Section 6 discusses and presents the first-differenced and system dynamic panel results. Section 7 concludes the paper with a summary.
Literature Review
Financial intermediaries serve as the medium of the savings-investment process. One fundamental question is: will development of financial intermediaries exert a positive effect on economic growth? For a long period of time, economists have had very different views on this. For example, Robert Lucas (1988) believed that "the importance of financial matters is very badly over-stressed in popular and even much professional discussion," while Merton Miller (1998) countered with "that financial markets contribute to economic growth is a proposition almost too obvious for serious discussion." Amid such disagreements, the literature on finance and growth continues to expand with new theoretical models and advanced empirical methods. Recently, a large body of research, especially empirical work, suggests that devel-opment of financial intermediaries exerts a positive effect on economic growth, rather than following economic growth passively.
A variety of theoretical models have been proposed to analyze the connection between financial development and economic growth. Levine (2005) presented a survey of theories on the issue and listed five possible channels through which finance may influence growth. These channels include: (i) providing information about possible investments so as to allocate capital efficiently; (ii) monitoring firms and exerting corporate governance; (iii) ameliorating risk; (iv) mobilizing and pooling savings; and (v) easing the exchange of goods and services.
There is also a vast empirical literature on the issue. Early cross-country studies based on cross-sectional regressions documented a positive correlation between financial development and economic activity (Goldsmith, 1969; King and Levine, 1993; Levine and Zervos, 1998; La Porta et al., 2002) . Goldsmith (1969) did a ground-breaking empirical study using data from 35 countries. Although a positive link between finance and economic growth was found, the question on whether there is a causal relationship between financial development and growth was not addressed. Besides, his work did not systematically control for other relevant explanatory variables. King and Levine (1993) added more control variables to their regression model and employed a dataset containing more countries. They ran regressions on a cross-country sample of 77 countries over the period , after controlling for other factors affecting economic growth, such as trade, education and political stability. However, the causality issue was again not formally dealt with. Levine and Zervos (1998) further added measures of stock markets to their regression model and systematically controlled for other factors affecting long-run growth including banking development. They showed that stock market liquidity and banking development can predict economic growth. However, none of these cross-country studies gave a satisfactory answer to the causality question.
To answer the question of whether financial development is a leading indicator or a fundamental factor of economic growth, instrumental variables were employed in several crosscountry studies. Levine (1998 Levine ( , 1999 and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) identified a country's legal origin as a valid instrumental variable and found that financial development has a significant positive impact on economic growth. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) further applied a more advanced econometric technique, the generalized moments method (GMM) for dynamic panel data, on a panel of 71 countries over the period 1960-1995. This advanced technique yielded the same result as the traditional cross-sectional instrumental variable regressions. That is, the exogenous component of financial development is positively associated with economic growth. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) also used GMM estimators for dynamic panel data and found that financial development has a large and positive effect on total factor productivity growth. Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) found that the indicators of financial development that are correlated with total factor productivity growth are different from those that stimulate investment using GMM. Dynamic panel models permit the use of instrumental variables for all the explanatory variables so that more precise estimates can be obtained.
Thus, quite a few studies have examined the relationship between finance and growth using dynamic panel models in recent years. For example, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) examined whether the relationship between finance and growth varies with inflation. Rioja and Valev (2004a) examined the effects of financial development on the sources of growth in different groups of countries with panel data of 74 countries. Rioja and Valev (2004b) further found that the impact of financial development on growth may be nonlinear. Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) and Beck and Levine (2004) applied dynamic panel techniques to their regression analyses after adding measures of stock markets to their models. Their results suggested that some exogenous components of bank and stock market development can have a large impact on economic growth. Finally, many time-series studies on the relationship between finance and growth have also documented financial development's positive impact on economic growth (Jung, 1986; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Neusser and Kugler, 1998; Arestis et al., 2001; Xu, 2000; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Bekaert et al., 2005) .
A few recent papers studied the relationship between finance and growth in individual countries. Compared with cross-country studies, in studies of individual countries, researchers can design specific measures of financial development according to the particular characteristics of the country. These studies can also avoid dealing with country-specific factors in regression analysis. In a study of the United States, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) found that the branch deregulation boosted bank-lending quality and accelerated economic growth. They also found evidence that financial development stimulated economic growth. By examining individual states of the United States from 1900 to 1940, Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2003) also confirmed that a well-functioning banking system boosts economic growth through improving capital allocation. Beck, Levine and Levkov (2010) assessed the impact of bank deregulation on the distribution of income in the United States from 1970s through 1990s. They found that deregulation reduces income inequality in the U.S. Rousseau and Sylla (2005) set up a set of multivariate time series models that relate banking and equity market activity to investment, imports and business incorporations of the United States from 1790 to 1850. They found strong support for the hypothesis of "finance-led growth" in the U.S. Rousseau (1999) studied Japan over the period . Through a set of vector autoregressive models, their results offered evidence that financial factors played a leading role in promoting Japan's rise to world power during the Meiji period. Guiso et al. (2004) studied the effect of local financial development in Italy. Their results indicated that financial development promotes firm growth and enhances the probability that an individual starts her own business.
To improve the understanding of the relationship between financial development and economic growth, more detailed micro-level data have been employed in recent years, both at the industry and firm levels. Rajan and Zingales' (1998) influential paper tested the hypothesis that, at the industry level, the sectors that are more dependent on external financing will have higher growth in the countries with more-developed financial markets. Their results supported the hypothesis and confirmed that financial development has a positive influence on industrial growth. Wurgler (2000) employed industry-level data to examine the impact of financial development on economic growth through the channel of capital allocation. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) investigated the impact of bank concentration on industrial growth using a sample of 36 industries in 41 countries. They found that bank concentration promotes the growth of industries that are more dependent on external finance. Kumar et al. (1999) showed that the average firm size in industries that are heavy users of external finance is larger in countries with better financial markets. Therefore, they concluded that financial development has a positive effect on external finance and hence on firm size. Claessens and Laeven (2003) further examined the joint impact of financial development and property rights on growth in different industries. They provided evidence that financial development improves financial access and better property rights foster growth through better asset allocation. Beck at al.
(2005) used firm-level survey data covering 54 countries to evaluate the impact of financing obstacles on firm growth and found that the negative impact of financial obstacles on growth is more substantial for small firms. Beck et al. (2008) showed that industries with a larger share of small firms grow faster in economies with well-developed financial systems.
China's Financial System: A Historical Review
China has been experiencing very rapid and stable economic growth since the start of its reforms in 1978. Its economy is now the second largest just behind the U.S. and it may become the largest economy in the world in 10 years based on the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005) . Although China is playing an increasingly significant role in the world economy and its financial system has been subject to substantial structural reforms, its financial system is still quite underdeveloped, lagging far behind other parts of the economy in terms of transformation from central planning to market-based operations. To understand this situation, we need to go back to the history of China's financial system.
In this section, we review the institutional history, regulation evolution, and economic environment of the Chinese financial system. We divide the history into three periods: before 1994, from 1994 to China's WTO entry in 2001, and after the WTO entry.
Before 1994
Before the start of its transition in 1978, there was no market-based financial system in China. One single bank, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), functioned as both the central bank and the only commercial bank for all banking transactions in China. This highly centralized financial system was transformed into a two-tier system when the four state-owned commercial banks (the Big Four) were formally established. Since 1984, the PBOC began to function as the central bank and the Big Four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) took over commercial banking business from the PBOC. During this period, these four banks were known as specialized banks as shown in Table 1 . They generally extended loans to state-owned enterprises regardless of profitability. Because of this policy lending, there was very limited competition among the Big Four until the mid-1990s. However, following economic reforms in the 1980s, the establishments of new banks and other financial institutions became a source of competition in the financial sector. Bank of Communications (BOCOM) was the first state-owned joint-equity bank, which was established in 1986. Further, foreign banks were gradually allowed to become an integral part of China's banking sector. In the meanwhile, some non-banking financial institutions started to enter China's financial system in the mid-1980s, including trust and investment companies, financial companies, financial leasing companies, and urban and rural credit cooperatives. Also, starting from the mid-1980s, the old way of centrally planning the allocation of financial resources was gradually phased out. To some degree, local governments began to have the rights to decide on their own resource allocation via loans or self-raised funds. Xu (2000 and 2003) showed that banks were more efficient in allocating resources than state budgetary appropriation over the period 1980-1994 in China. However, during this period, China's banking sector was overwhelmingly dominated by the Big Four. Their total assets accounted for 64% of the total assets of China's entire financial system (Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 1995) . But, the Big Four were renowned for their low efficiency and had been burdened with a large amount of non-performing loans (NPLs).
From 1994 to China's WTO Entry in 2001
Sweeping reforms on China's financial system were initiated in 1994. A series of financial reforms from 1994 to 2000 entailed a progressive move toward less administrative and more independent banking operations. First, in order to relieve the Big Four from policy lending, three policy banks were established in 1994. Second, China's monetary policy was shifted towards indirect monetary control. Starting in 1998, credit planning for SOCBs was abandoned. Table 2 . Established mostly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, these joint-equity commercial banks have gradually increased their collective market share while the Big Four's market share has gradually decreased. Source: PBOC's and the respective banks' websites.
In the mid-1990s, a few city commercial banks were established by consolidating local rural and urban cooperatives. They take the form of joint-equity banks with their business restricted to their location cities. By the end of 1999, 90 such banks were operating in China, with total assets of 554.7 billion yuan (PBOC 2000). China's city commercial banks are referred to as "the third tier of China's banking industry". In a field survey of Chinese banks, Ferri (2008) found that the "New Tigers" (including state-owned joint-equity banks and city commercial banks) are better performing than the SOCBs. The unhealthy link between stateowned entities (SOEs) and SOCBs still negatively affects the performance of SOCBs today.
Furthermore, the restriction on foreign bank entries was relaxed in 1994. During this period, the PBOC began to make recommendations to improve bank risk controls and to follow the Basel requirements. Lastly, two stock exchanges in China-the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange were established in 1990 and 1991, respectively. China's stock market began to take shape although it was renowned for its lack of transparency and fairness throughout the 1990s.
After the WTO Entry
China Table 3 . In sum, reforms during 1978-2006 are largely based on three main pillars: bank restructuring, financial liberalization, and regulation and supervision strengthening.
Variables and Data
This section defines variables and describes data. We are going to use city-level data to examine the relationship between financial development and economic growth in China. 1 To measure financial development, we construct a number of financial indicators. In the meanwhile, we control for different conditioning information sets in our growth regression model.
Variables
To investigate whether the exogenous component of financial development positively influences economic growth, a growth regression model is set up with the annual growth rate of real per capita GDP as the dependent variable. The independent variables include a variable representing financial development and a conditioning information set controlling for other factors.
1 We carry out the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) test to test capital mobility among Chinese cities as a justification for the use of city-level data. The results from both cross-sectional and panel regressions support the view of a low degree of capital mobility which makes the analysis meaningful. As of the panel regression, we use a fixed-effects estimator where city dummies and year dummies are included. Boyreau-Debray (2003) and Boyreau-Debray and
Wei (2004) found evidence that the degree of China's inter-provincial capital mobility is low.
Indicators for development of financial intermediation
Traditional indicators of financial development have been employed by existing crosscountry studies, such as the value of credits provided by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP . However, China's statistical data do not provide exact information for us to calculate such indicators at the city level. Hence, researchers who study the finance-growth relationship of China have developed a set of indicators to represent China's financial development, taking the data constraint into consideration.
This paper makes use of these indicators to examine the relationship between financial development and economic growth in China. Here are the five indicators measured at the city level:
(1) Credit is the ratio of total loans in the financial system (banking institutions and nonbanking financial institutions) to GDP, which measures the overall depth of financial intermediation.
(2) Deposit is the ratio of total deposits in the financial system to GDP, which measures the overall size of financial intermediaries.
(3) Savings is the ratio of total household savings deposited in the financial system to GDP, which serves as a proxy of China's financial development in terms of mobilizing household savings.
(4) Loans Over Appro is the share of fixed asset investment financed by domestic loans relative to that financed by state budgetary appropriation. Fixed asset investment comes from different sources including domestic loans, state budgetary appropriation, foreign investment and self-raised funds. Among these sources, loans are considered more efficient than state budget appropriation in terms of capital allocation. Thus we follow the literature (Liu and Li ,2001; Guariglia and Poncet, 2008; Chen, 2006) and make use of this ratio to measure the substitution of more market and profit-oriented financial transactions for state budget appropriation in order to allocate capital more efficiently.
(5) Corporate is the ratio of corporate deposits to total deposits in the financial system. This measures China's financial development in providing corporate banking services.
Conditioning information sets
To use conditioning information sets to capture the influence of factors other than the financial indicators on economic growth, we collect data for those control variables that are traditionally used in the finance-growth literature. To examine the sensitivity of our empirical results further, we divide these variables into four different conditioning information sets. The sets are defined as follows:
(1) Simple Set: the constant, the logarithm of the initial per capita GDP 2 (Initial PCGDP)
to capture the convergence effect, and the logarithm of the initial level of education 3
(Education) to control for human capital accumulation.
(2) Medium Set: the simple set plus the share of state-owned entities in total fixed asset investments (SOE) as an inverse proxy for the progress of economic reforms, and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to control for inflation.
(3) Policy Set: the medium set plus the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP (FDI) to measure the degree of openness of the local economy, and government expenditure over GDP (Government) to control for city government size.
(4) Full Set: the policy set plus business volume of postal and telecommunication services (Postal&Telecom) to indicate the status of information transmission, and the density of roads 4 (Infrastructure) as a proxy for local infrastructure.
Note that, due to the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between economic growth and the explanatory variables, we use natural logarithms of these variables in regressions.
Data
By the Chinese government administrative classification, there are three levels of cities in China: municipalities, prefecture-level cities, 5 and county-level cities. There are 4 municipalities: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing. They are governed directly by the central government and they are not subject to the administration of any provincial government. Each province in China has about 10 prefecture-level cities, 6 which are governed directly by the provincial government. And, a county-level city is usually governed by a prefecture-level city.
In this paper, a "city" refers to either a prefecture-level city or a municipality.
We collect a set of panel data from 286 Chinese prefecture-level cities and municipalities over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . The data is from the China City Statistical Yearbook for various years. The yearbook provides two kinds of statistical data for each variable. One set of data is from municipalities and urban regions of prefecture-level cities only, and the other set of data 2 The "initial per capita GDP" is per capita GDP in yuan of the previous year.
3 The "initial level of education" is the percentage of students in the total population enrolled in secondary schools in the previous year.
4 The "density of roads" is defined as the total length of roads in kilometers per one million square kilometers.
5 Some prefecture-level cities (15 in total by the end of 2006) are further defined as sub-province cities. However, in terms of administrative statistics, they are still considered as prefecture-level cities.
is from municipalities, urban and rural regions of prefecture-level and county-level cities. We use the latter so as to take into account any economic activity that might have occurred in any region of China.
Due to data limitation, we use the provincial data for the variables Loans Over Appro， CPI and Government. This means that all the cities in the same province have the same value for these variables. The provincial data is from the China Statistical Yearbook for various years. Notes: The significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are identified by ***, ** and *, respectively. While this analysis does not resolve the issue of causality, the initial value regressions alleviate two critical weaknesses of the "contemporaneous" regressions where dependent and explanatory variables are all averaged over the same period. First, it is possible that a common shock to the dependent and explanatory variables during the same period drives the empirical findings of the "contemporaneous" regressions. Second, the "contemporaneous" regressions overlook the potential endogenous determination of the dependent and the explanatory variables (Levine and Zervos, 1998) . Table 5 summarizes the least squares results with different conditioning information sets.
Finance and Growth: Cross-Sectional Analyses
The results indicate a very strong positive association between the development of financial intermediation and economic growth. For brevity, we report only the coefficients on the financial development indicators. Each of the five financial indicators is significantly correlated with economic growth at the 5% significance level in the simple, medium, policy and full conditioning information set regressions, except that Corporate is significant at the 10% significance level in the simple set regression. In addition, the results show that the strong relationship between financial development and economic growth does not merely reflect contemporaneous shocks. Furthermore, financial development does not simply follow economic growth. 
Methodology
The generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) estimators for dynamic panel data (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998 ) have been applied widely in recent years, especially in deriving the impact of financial development on economic growth. There are several advantages of using GMM panel estimators over purely crosssectional estimators. First, we are able to control for time fixed effects and city-specific effects.
Second, we can use appropriate lags of the independent variables as instrumental variables to deal with possible endogeneity in the regressors. In our case of growth regressions, a simultaneity bias caused by the joint determination of financial development and economic growth may produce inconsistent estimators. Also, the variables in conditioning information sets may suffer from an endogeneity problem. The GMM panel estimators allow us to address these econometric problems using lagged observations of the explanatory variables as instruments (internal instruments). As such, we can reliably examine the impact of the exogenous component of financial development on economic growth in China.
Specifically, let y be the logarithm of real per capita GDP and X be a set of explanatory variables including one of the financial indicators and control variables contained in one of the conditioning information sets but excluding the lagged dependent variable. Consider the following regression equation: Thus, to eliminate city-specific effects, we take the first difference of Equation (4) to obtain:
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Now, instrumental variables are needed to deal with two issues: (a) endogeneity of the regres- In our case, these moment conditions imply that the twice and further lagged values of the real per capita GDP, the financial indicators and the variables contained in a conditioning information set can be used as instrumental variables to obtain the first-differenced GMM estimators.
However, as Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1996) and Blundell and Bond (1998) pointed out, the instruments available for the first-difference equation are weak instruments when the explanatory variables are persistent over time. Weak instruments can result in serious finite sample biases. The variance of the coefficients gets larger asymptotically. To deal with the potential bias and imprecision of the first-differenced GMM estimators, additional moment conditions are proposed for an equation expressed in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) . When an equation in differences and an equation in levels are combined as a system, the estimators based on the moment conditions associated with this system are called system GMM estimators. The instruments for the equation in levels are the lagged differences of the explanatory variables. One additional assumption needs to be made to ensure the validity of the additional instrumental variables: the first differences of the independent variables in Equation (4) 
In our case, these moment conditions imply that the first lagged differences of the real per capita GDP, the financial indicators and the variables contained in the conditioning information sets can be used as additional instruments. Indeed, Bond et al. (2001) and Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) pointed out that the system GMM estimators should be employed for growth regressions to generate consistent and efficient parameter estimates.
Two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) are to be carried out: (1) The Sargan test 9 for the over-8 As pointed out by Arellano and Bover (1995) , only the most recent differences can be used as instrumental variables for an equation in levels. Otherwise, we will have redundant moment conditions, since lagged variables are already used as instruments for the equation in differences. 9 We report the Sargan test statistics rather than Hansen J tests, because Sargan and difference-in-Sargan tests are not so vulnerable to instrument proliferation as they do not depend on an estimate of the optimal weighting matrix (Roodmand, 2009 
Techniques for Reducing the Instrument Count
The instrument count easily grows large relative to the sample size as the time period
T or the number of explanatory variables rises when differenced GMM or system GMM estimators are performed. Roodman (2009) To address the issue of "too many instruments", we follow the techniques suggested by Roodman (2009) . The first is to use only one or two lags instead of all available lags for instruments. This strategy to limit the number of instruments generated from first-differenced and system GMM estimators has been adopted by several researchers Giedeman and Compton, 2009; Demir and Dahi, 2009 ). The second is to collapse the instruments through additions into smaller sets. To effectively mitigate the problems caused by instrument proliferation, Roodman (2009) suggested combining the two strategies.
In this paper, we follow Roodman's (2009) approach to both collapse instruments and limit the lag depth in first-differenced and system GMM estimators.
In the meanwhile, we carry out difference-in-Sargan tests to examine the validity of the system GMM instruments, i.e., the validity of the first lagged differences of the explanatory variables. In addition, we also perform difference-in-Sargan tests for the validity of instruments based on lagged growth, which are viewed as problematic by Roodman (2009).
Regression Results

Results Using First-differenced GMM Estimators
Although system-GMM estimators have advantages over first-differenced GMM estimators as mentioned in Subsection 6.2, weak Sargan tests are less problematic in first-differenced GMM estimations. The results from first-differenced GMM estimations are summarized in with each information set, while it is significant only at the 5% significance level with the simple set. The regression estimates are also economically large. The signs and significance levels are in line with the results from purely cross-sectional estimators.
Results Using System GMM Estimators
Tables 7-8 12 report system GMM estimates of Equation (2) with the policy set and the full set respectively. To further ensure the credibility of system GMM estimators, we carry out two different regressions for each financial development indicator by collapsing and un-collapsing the instruments. 13 Tables 7-8 is established for these regressions. We hence confirm that the overall size and depth of the financial sector spur economic growth and the development of financial intermediation in China positively influences economic growth through the mobilization of corporate deposits. 12 We limit the lag depth to one for every explanatory variable, including both the financial indicators and the variables in the control sets.
13 The difference-in-Sargan tests for system GMM instruments are not available when we collapse the instruments and use only one lag per instrumental variable. The model is under-indentified without system GMM instruments.
14 Roodman (2009) claims that "It seems likely that lagged growth is an invalid instrument in the LLB regressions, that system GMM is invalid"(page 155). Our results confirm his findings. When the p-values of the difference-in Sargan test for the validity of system GMM instruments and instruments based on lagged growth are lower than the conventional levels simultaneously or only the latter is lower, the regression fails to pass the Sargan test for joint validity of the instruments. heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for a second-order serial correlation, which is asymptotically N(0,1) under the null of no second-order serial correlation. Cities in Tibet are excluded from the sample due to missing data. The significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are identified by ***, ** and *, respectively. Notes: The standard errors are in parentheses. The test statistics and standard errors are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for a second-order serial correlation, which is asymptotically N(0,1) under the null of no second-order serial correlation. Cities of Tibet are excluded from the sample due to missing data. The significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are identified by ***, ** and *, respectively.
The Loan Over Appro regressions fail to pass the tests in any specification. Although we are unable to infer a causality relationship between this financial indicator and economic growth, their positive correlation is real. This implies that more active use of market-oriented and profit-driven financial transactions, such as loans relative to state budget appropriation, is positively associated with economic growth. In addition, this conclusion is in line with those of Liu and Li (2001) , Guariglia and Poncet (2008) and Chen (2006) who employ the same measure with provincial data. 15 However, the coefficient of Savings turns to be negative from system GMM estimations, but loses its significance for economic growth. The difference-in-Sargan tests of the "uncollapsed" variants indicate that the system GMM instruments are invalid. Considering the positive relationship from the OLS and differenced GMM estimators, we consider the negative coefficients from system GMM estimators as a fluke of problematic system GMM instruments. 16 However, it is difficult to conclude that Savings plays a significantly positive role to promote growth from the above evidence. China has a very high savings rate of about 40%, which may cause low household consumption as a percentage of GDP and hurt economic growth. This possibly explains the reported unclear relationship between Savings and growth in China.
In summary, we find that the development of financial intermediation in China after the WTO entry positively influences economic growth. 17 This finding is consistent with most cross-country studies on the relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth. However, this finding is contrary to several existing studies on the finance-growth relationship in China (Boyreau-Debray, 2003; Hasan, Wachtel and Zhou, 2007; Guariglia and Poncet, 2008) . These studies argued that financial deepening in China did not contribute to economic growth, since banks, especially the SOCBs, continued to support loss-making SOEs and, as a government policy to reduce poverty, capital was channeled to slow-growing regions.
This inefficient allocation of capital was blamed as the main cause of the negative effect of 15 As a robustness check, we replace Loan Over Appro with the share of fixed asset investment that is financed by domestic loans. The OLS, differenced GMM and system GMM regressions produce significantly positive coefficients. 16 The difference-in-Sargan tests of the "un-collapsed" variants, which are reported in the appendix, indicate that the system GMM instruments are invalid. If the system GMM instruments are dropped, the regressions are brought back to differenced GMM where Savings positively influences growth. 17 In order to investigate the issue of this causality further, we apply a panel Granger causality test (Granger, 1969) to our data. Freeman (1983) developed a "direct Granger method" to assess the Granger causality and determine the causality direction of a relationship between two variables in a direct way: regress one variable on the lagged values of the other variable and itself, and then use an F-test to examine the null hypothesis that all the coefficients on the lagged values of the other variable are zero. We find no evidence that economic growth Grangercauses financial development. These results are available upon request. Furthermore, the positive estimated coefficients are also economically significant (large in value). For example, based on the coefficient reported in column (1) of Table 7 from the "collapsed" system GMM estimation with the policy set, a city exogenously moving from the 25th percentile in the distribution of the ratio of total loans to GDP (53.96%) to the 75th percentile (92.99%) will have a 2.01% larger GDP growth rate.
Most control variables show expected signs although not always statistically significant.
We find evidence of convergence because the coefficient of the lagged per capita GDP, Initial PCGDP, is significantly smaller than unity in most regressions. We find that human capital has a positive impact on economic growth. The variable, SOE, which is the share of stateowned entities in total investment, always shows a negative effect on economic growth. This indicates that the relatively poor performance of state-owned entities hurts economic growth. 
Sensitivity Analysis: a City Dummy Variable
To ensure robustness of our findings further, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by intro- We conducted the sensitivity analysis using system GMM estimators with the policy set.
The results are presented in Table 11 . We can see that adding this city dummy does not change our conclusions. That is, the strong connection between financial development and economic growth is not associated with whether a city is a coastal city, a capital city or a city with foreign banks, a characteristic that was not taken into account in our baseline regressions. Moreover, the "collapsed" Loans Over Appro regression passes the Sargan test and this result strengthens the conclusion in Subsection 6.4. This indicates that the development of financial intermediation has a causal and positive impact on economic growth through the substitution of loans for state budget appropriation. heteroskedasticity. The city dummy takes the value of 1 on 44 cities (coastal cities, capital cities and cities with foreign banks). m2 is a test for a second-order serial correlation, which is asymptotically N(0,1) under the null of no second-order serial correlation. Cities of Tibet are excluded from the sample due to missing data. The significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are identified by ***, ** and *, respectively.
Conclusions
This paper However, household savings are found to have an unclear effect on economic growth. The results from OLS and differenced GMM estimators suggest a positive relationship between household savings and economic growth, while results from system GMM estimators suggest a negative but insignificant effect, which we consider may be a by-product of problematic instruments.
We pay particular attention to the issue of "too many instruments" when first-differenced GMM and system GMM estimators are employed. Techniques for reducing the instrument count are applied, including limiting the lag depth for instruments and collapsing instruments.
Furthermore, we test for the validity of the full instrument set and subsets of instruments rigorously. The conclusions are drawn carefully based on both complicated estimators and simple estimators. To examine the sensitivity of our results, different conditioning information sets are experimented with. We have also carried out a sensitivity analysis by adding a city dummy to differentiate between coastal cities, capital cities and cities with foreign bank entries. These analyses show that our results are robust.
More insights into the linkage between financial development and economic growth in China can be obtained if more detailed city-level data are available, especially data on shares of SOCBs and joint-equity commercial banks in total credit. Also, a firm-level study of the impact of external finance on firm growth may produce more insightful results. These are on our agenda for future research. heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation, which is asymptotically N(0,1) under the null of no second-order serial correlation. Cities in Tibet are excluded from the sample due to missing data. The significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are identified by ***, ** and *, respectively. heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for a second-order serial correlation, which is asymptotically N(0,1) under the null of no second-order serial correlation. Cities in Tibet are excluded from the sample due to missing data. The significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are identified by ***, ** and *, respectively. Notes: The standard errors are in parentheses. The test statistics and standard errors are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for a second-order serial correlation, which is asymptotically N(0,1) under the null of no second-order serial correlation. Cities in Tibet are excluded from the sample due to missing data. The significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are identified by ***, ** and *, respectively. Notes: The standard errors are in parentheses. The test statistics and standard errors are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m2 is a test for a second-order serial correlation, which is asymptotically N(0,1) under the null of no second-order serial correlation. Cities of Tibet are excluded from the sample due to missing data. The significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% are identified by ***, ** and *, respectively.
